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Advancing Industrial Relations Theory: An Analytical Synthesis of British-American and 
Pluralist-Radical Ideas  
 
Bruce E. Kaufman and Gregor Gall 
 
Abstract  
This paper advances industrial relations (IR) theory through an analytical development and 
synthesis of four central features of the employment relationship which cut across pluralist and 
radical/Marxist frames of reference. These features are: generation of an economic surplus, 
cooperation-conflict dialectic, indeterminate nature of the employment contract, and 
asymmetric authority and power in the firm. The paper is noteworthy because it translates 
these pluralist-radical ideas into a marginalist-based economics framework and gives them 
formal/analytical definition and representation in one diagram. American IR has been more 
receptive to economic modeling and British IR (and French IR) have been more receptive to 
radical-Marxist ideas. Hence, this paper also helps integrate these diverse national traditions by 
combining both features into one IR theory model.  
 
Keywords: industrial relations theory, British-American industrial relations, pluralist-radical, 




Two recent addresses by well-known industrial relations scholars reach very similar conclusions 
about the state of the field. Michael Piore (2011), in a published address presented as the 2010 
Annual Lecture sponsored by the British Journal of Industrial Relations, declares that “Industrial 
relations is in trouble” (p. 792). Similarly, Harry Arthurs (2014), in a keynote address to the 50th 
annual conference of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association recently published in this 
journal (Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations), concludes that “IR as a discipline and 
profession […] has arrived at a cul-de-sac” (p. 431). 
 
Both Piore and Arthurs argue that the IR field’s downward slide arises from a conjunction of 
adverse developments. The traditional IR policy model centred on collective bargaining and 
employment regulation, they conclude, no longer has good fit with globalized post-industrial 
societies. Likewise, the IR model has been perhaps fatally undermined by market-favouring 
economic and political trends, particularly in Anglo-American liberal market nations. Practice 
and policy malaise in industrial relations has then been compounded by intellectual malaise and, 
in particular, the field’s failure to develop a theory base which gives compelling intellectual 
support and credence to its policy program. According to Piore, “the intellectual framework of 
industrial relations has failed” (p. 793) while Arthur poses the challenge as “the re-invention of 
IR” (p. 432). Given this diagnosis, Piore and Arthurs suggest three lines of reconstruction and 
advance: 1- broaden IR’s intellectual and policy foundation from collective bargaining and labour 
law to the dynamics and tensions of the employment relationship; 2- rebuild IR’s theory base so 
it can successfully confront orthodox economic theory and neo-liberal political philosophy; and 
3- rejuvenate the IR coalition of progressive-critical/radical writers and paradigms.  
 
Because the employment relationship (ER) is a large and diverse subject, we focus on four key 
characteristics: creation of an economic surplus, conflict vs. cooperation, indeterminacy of the 
   
2 
 
employment contract, and asymmetry of power between capital and labour. These 
characteristics are generic to the employment relationship, including derivatives such as agency 
and contract labour, but can be examined through different frames of reference (Fox, 1974; 
Budd and Bhave, 2008). An innovative feature of this paper is an attempt to integrate elements 
of the pluralist and radical-Marxist (RM) frames, not done to the best of our knowledge in any 
other theory article (Edwards, Bélanger and Wright, 2007, being perhaps the closest exception) 
published in the four major British and American IR journals (BJIR, IRJ, ILRR, IR) or Canadian 
journal (RI/IR).  
 
Another innovative feature is to develop and formalize these pluralist-radical ideas using 
analytical tools from orthodox economics, thus engaging the opposition on its own ground. This 
strategy of using marginalist-based microeconomics to derive contra-orthodox conclusions was 
used by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in their early writings on the economic case for socialism 
(reprinted in Problems of Modern Industry, 1902) and John Commons in The Distribution of 
Wealth (1893) who used marginal utility diagrams to make the case that a paying job should be 
a legally recognized human right. This same method was later adopted by neo-Marxists, such as 
John Roemer (1982), Jon Elster (1985), and Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1990) who 
sought to demonstrate and derive traditional Marxian concepts and hypotheses using 
conventional tools of microeconomics in a strategy called Analytical Marxism. 
 
In addition to integrating across pluralist and radical schools, the paper also integrates across 
British and American IR traditions. The British IR tradition has traditionally had a strong critical-
radical-Marxist wing with well-known names, such as Cole, Hyman and Kelly (Hyman, 1975; 
Kelly, 1998; Gall, 2003; Frege, Kelly, and McGovern, 2011). Conversely, the American tradition 
from its founding days has taken an uninterested-to-hostile stance toward the radical-Marxist 
perspective and has resisted theoretical dialogue (Perlman, 1928; Kochan, 1982; Kaufman, 
2004a). Our paper is in part an effort to get American IR scholars to see that the critical -Marxist 
literature has fruitful ideas for IR theory-building which deserve consideration (also see Hillard 
and McIntyre, 2009). Conversely, the British IR tradition has since the ascendancy of the Oxford 
School in the 1950s under Clegg and Flanders contained relatively few conventional 
(microeconomic-based) labour economists, expressed a cool and sometimes unreceptive 
attitude to formal models and analytical economics (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2003: 44), and has 
conceptualized both pluralist and RM frames largely from a sociology, politics, and history 
perspective (Fleetwood, 2006; Ackers and Wilkinson, 2008). Much the opposite is true in 
American IR where economics has been the dominant discipline, labour economists such as 
Freeman from the USA and Gunderson from Canada, have occupied top positions, and 
economics-style models are widely used in journal articles. Over the last one-to-two decades a 
discernible convergence in American and British IR research traditions has occurred, particularly 
in the use of multivariate statistical techniques, but American and British IR journals still reflect 
persistent differences in theoretical, methodological, and ideological orientations.  
 
Thus, our paper not only bridges across pluralist and radical/Marxist frames but also across 
American and British approaches by applying American-type economic modeling to British-type 
critical IR. In this respect, the paper represents in microcosm the synthesis of traditions which 
exemplify Canadian industrial relations, most clearly with respect to alternative American and 
British influences but also the French tradition (Murray, Morin, and Da Costa, 1996; Da Costa, 
2005) as expressed in greater openness to critiques of liberal capitalism, complementary 
receptivity to radical/Marxist ideas, and the concept of IR as a system of social regulation per 
   
3 
 
the French Régulation school (Boyer and Saillard, 2002; also Bélanger, Edwards, and Haiven, 
1994).  
 
While the idea of theoretical integration appeals in principle to everyone, in practice it is a 
perilous endeavour because the inevitable compromises and mixing and matching end up 
attracting critical arrows from unhappy people on all sides. Some readers, for example, may 
believe it is impossible to do justice to radical-Marxist ideas if developed with marginalist 
economic tools, others may regard economics-type models as empty formalism, and yet others 
may agree with Hyman (2004) that an integrative theory of industrial relations is neither 
possible nor desirable. Readers on the other side of the divide may argue, on the other hand, 
that radical-Marxist ideas are logically defective, mostly non-economic, or politically driven (e.g., 
labour theory of value, class struggle). Then, people on both sides may feel issues of process and 
problem-solving get short-changed. Our response is that theory development is antecedent to 
problem-solving (Commons, 1934: 722, calls theory “a spade for digging up facts”) and, while 
pluralist, radical-Marxist, and orthodox microeconomic paradigms are substantially 
incommensurate writ large, individual ideas, components, and authors can be integrated into a 
value-added hybrid theory of the employment relationship much in the spirit of IR’s multi-
discipline, multi-method, and pragmatic ‘judge the results’ heritage.  
 
Key Features of the Employment Relationship 
 
Arguably the authoritative reference source on modern industrial relations is the Sage 
Handbook of Industrial Relations by Blyton, Bacon, Fiorito and Heery (2008). In the Preface, the 
editors explain that the central areas of IR interest had in decades past been “trade unions, 
collective bargaining and strikes”, but that “It is now widely recognized that the different 
aspects of the employment relationship are what define the field” (p. xviii). This proposition is 
also depicted in the ‘family tree’ diagram of British industrial relations featured in Kaufman 
(2014) where the pluralist, radical, and unitarist streams of thought meld into study of the 
employment relationship. We perceive, therefore, that Piore and Arthurs’ first change item—
shift from a narrow focus on collective bargaining and labour law to a broad focus on the 
employment relationship—is already well under way so we focus this paper on their second and 
third items.   
 
A number of writers discuss the employment relationship and its key features viz. the study of 
industrial relations (e.g., Marsden, 1999; Edwards, 2003; Budd, 2004; Deakin and Wilkinson, 
2005; Kaufman, 2010; Godard, 2011). A particularly well-articulated account spanning pluralist 
and radical/Marxist frames is by Blyton and Turnbull (2004). They identify four ER dimensions as 
fundamental to industrial relations (p. 41):  
 
1- creation of an economic surplus, 
2- co-existence of conflict and co-operation, 
3- indeterminate nature of the exchange relationship, 
 4- asymmetry of power. 
 
We briefly describe each in this section and then analytically represent them in the next section.  
 
Dimensions #2-#4 are shared in the pluralist and RM literatures, although somewhat differently 
theorized and with a more polarized and ineradicable representation in the latter. Dimension 
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#1, on the other hand, is mostly an RM idea. A contribution of this paper is to call the attention 
of pluralists to the economic surplus concept, partly for the IR insights it provides but also 
because it undermines the orthodox economics argument that markets distribute income in an 
equitable and de-politicized manner. (Marginalist tools need not yield competitive theory 
conclusions.)   
 
 Blyton and Turnbull do not specifically define the surplus concept but say it is analogous to a 
nation’s discretionary income (p. 24). Among RM writers, the definition of economic surplus 
differs (Davis, 1992), particularly between people who use the Marxian labour theory of value 
(e.g., Resnick and Wolff, 2006; Fine and Saad-Filho, 2010) and those who do not (e.g., Robinson, 
1966; Mayer, 1994; Bowles, 2004). But, broadly conceived, the economic surplus is the amount 
of GDP remaining after paying socially necessary costs of production. The concept was 
prominent in classical economics, including Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776/1937), and became 
a linchpin in Marx’s political economy. In this tradition, because the surplus is a nation’s 
discretionary income, it therefore is a social choice variable ultimately distributed to claimants 
by politically determined endowments and rules of the game. This idea is also prominent in the 
Fabian tradition of the Webbs (Webb and Webb, 1897, 1902; Kaufman, 2013) and the 
Commons’ institutional tradition (Commons, 1983, 1934; Kaufman and Barry, 2014).  
 
This observation leads to feature #2 of the employment relationship. Industrial relations (e.g., 
Walton and McKersie, 1965; Kochan, 1998; Edwards, 2003) posits that the employment relation 
contains a mixed incentive for capital and labour to cooperate in order to make the surplus as 
large as possible (win-win) but also to have conflict because the two groups/classes struggle 
over the production process and distribution of the surplus (win-lose). The cooperation/conflict 
dynamic stems, in turn, from a unique feature that distinguishes labour from other factor 
inputs; that is, labour is embedded in human beings (is not a commodity) and work supply is 
thus volitional (Kaufman, 2010). This feature is also central to labour process theory which 
likewise spans pluralist and RM traditions (Thompson and Newsome, 2004; Jaros, 2010).  
 
Feature #3, indeterminacy of the labour exchange, further accentuates the possibility of conflict. 
Because labour supply is volitional and employment contracts are inevitably incomplete, the 
terms of the labour exchange are open to bargaining, renegotiation, and power play once 
production commences. Both Marx (1867/1907) and Commons (1919) note that the firm 
purchases the worker’s labour time for a wage but only produces a product and earns a profit to 
the extent that labour time is converted to productive effort and work. As a result, managers 
and workers engage in a continual tacit and overt struggle over exercise of control, allocation of 
jobs, work intensity, and discipline. Likewise, contract incompleteness means the employer may 
engage in actions that are opportunistic or exploitative, such as terminating workers once the 
surplus is realized (Marsden, 1999; Thompson, 2003).  
 
These sources of conflict are often resolved in favour of employers by feature #4, the 
asymmetry of power in employment relationships. That is, the ownership of the means of 
production, excess supply of job seekers, and employers’ private property rights to manage the 
business as they deem fit, create a tipped playing field in labour markets and firm governance 
that favours the interests of employers over workers. This premise is shared in pluralist and RM 
frames (Budd, 2004; Hyman, 1975) but gets starker emphasis in the latter and is typically more 
directly linked to capital ownership and the Marxian reserve army of the unemployed.  
 
   
5 
 
All four of these ideas can be found in Smith’s Wealth of Nations and have been a staple 
(particularly #2-#4) of the industrial relations literature for a century. Each idea, in turn, is in an 
important way antithetical to the neoclassical/neo-liberal free market program which has 
dominated world economy policy since Thatcher and Reagan. But then one has to ask: if these 
ideas are such well-known and cogent arguments in the intellectual armory of pluralist and RM 
industrial relations, how has the field nonetheless lost so much authority and influence in policy 
debates to the extent that leading scholars describe IR as a failed project? One possibility is that 
modern IR writers have over several decades lost contact with the original paradigm’s core 
theory principles; another is that they have ceded the analytical battle ground to free market 
economists. What follows is a small first step to take it back. We acknowledge, before 
proceeding, that one can dismiss all of neoclassical economics (and, by implication, some of the 
analytical tools we use) as fatally flawed and walk away. However, seldom is an enemy defeated 




We next analytically represent these four employment relations principles. Figure 1 contains 
three panels that represent core sectors of the employment relationship: the labour market, 
firm and labour process, and macro economy. The demand/supply (DS) diagram of the labour 
market and Keynesian cross model of the macro economy are standard to conventional 
economics; the depiction of the firm and labour process is adapted from Kaufman (2004b). Our 
contribution is to use these diagrams to depict the four ER dimensions, derive new insights, 
show interconnections, and demonstrate linkages to both pluralist and RM traditions. We 
explain each diagram in order; however, we start first with a fourth feature—the “roof” over all 
three sectors. It is conspicuously omitted from economics textbooks. 
 




The roof brings in the political economy dimension that is an essential part of the pluralist-RM 
tradition, starting with Marx’s theory of the state and carrying through to the Webbs (1897) and 
Commons (1934) and later generations of writers (e.g., Dunlop, 1958; Hyman, 2008; Budd, 2004; 
Godard, 2004; Streeck, 2011). It symbolizes the building(s) housing the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches of the State. These government institutions collectively exercise the power 
of sovereignty and thereby set the rules of the game for labour markets and employment 
relationships, including factors such as contract and tort law, property rights, social safety net 
programs, labour regulatory agencies, court rulings, and policies of the central bank. A more 
detailed analysis would also include governance institutions at higher and lower levels of the 
employment relations system, such as international institutions (e.g., European Union) and firms 
and unions.  
 
The labour DS model in standard economics is unstructured and has no roof because the only 
active variables are demand, supply, and competition; to the degree a web of rules is present it 
takes the form of exogenous background factors, such as a given body of contract law and 
judicially enforced property rights. This theoretical tact on the web of rules elides three realities 
fundamental to industrial relations (Kaufman, 2010; Kaufman and Barry, 2014). The first is that 
the web of rules is endogenously determined in a political process at cascading levels of 
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governance and is therefore an object of social choice and social change. The second is that a 
particular web of rules, by defining rights, endowments and permissible actions, effectively 
structures the DS curves in the market and the labour process in the firms and thus determines 
their outcomes. The third is that the political process is seldom a level playing field, even in 
many well functioning democracies, and instead is tipped by money, influence, social position, 
and constitutional/legislative rules to yield outcomes favourable to the classes and groups in 
power—groups that may shift with electoral swings or, alternatively, remain entrenched for 
long periods of time.  
 
The roof therefore brings in the political economy dimension by showing how the visible hand of 
the State structures and controls the IR institutions which, in turn, structure and shape their 
operation and outcomes. In orthodox economics, therefore, wage rates are presented as market 
determined by individual action and natural forces of competition and thus take on an objective 
and a-political nature. In the pluralist and RM traditions, however, the location of the DS curves 
and resulting wage outcomes are dependent on the specific regime of market rules and 
endowments and these, in turn, are politically determined through collective action by classes 
and groups of people in control of the governance structures of the nation state and subsidiary 




The political economy dimension leads to the economic surplus concept. To proceed, we 
assume the nation state has crafted a particular web of rules and set of endowments for 
economic agents. We then move to the labour market in panel (a). The labour demand curve D1 
and supply curve S1 set the wage W1 and employment level L1 (point B). [Ignore for now the 
shaded band aspect of D1.] Value of GDP is the area under the demand curve, OABL1 (sum of the 
workers’ value marginal products = total product value). Assuming capital is fixed in the short 
run, omitting land (to stay within a two dimensional diagram), and assuming all productive 
managerial/supervisory hours are part of L1, the direct cost of production is the wage bill 
0W1BL1. The residual product value in the triangle area (W1AB) provides an upper bound 
estimate of the economy’s surplus.  
 
If one follows Marx (1867/1906) and assumes that the owners of capital are idle rentiers, like 
absentee landlords, who provide little-to-no productive contribution in return for their receipts 
of profit and interest (managers receive a wage/salary), and that capital is entirely the value of 
stored-up labour (via the labour theory of value), the triangle is unearned income and a surplus 
above social cost (aka, monopoly rent). It also provides a measure of labour exploitation—i.e., 
income earned by workers but not received (for a review of exploitation theories, see Hahnel, 
2007). If one instead follows neoclassical theory and assumes the entire triangle is a return to 
capital owners for a productive service (risk-bearing, saving, etc.), then surplus and labour 
exploitation are both zero. In either case, the diagram contains the Marxian division of society 
into two socio-economic classes—a working class receiving wage income (0W1BL1) and a 
property-owning capitalist class receiving profit income (W1AB). 
 
Importantly, Marx assumes the size of the economic surplus—and concomitant amount of 
labour exploitation—is much larger once competition has full time to act (Botwinick, 1993). That 
is, he reasons along conventional lines that competition in the long run lowers the price of all 
commodities until price just covers minimum average cost (Marx, 1849/ 1935; Fine and Saad-
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Filho, 2010). Since labour is traded like a commodity, this means its price (the wage) falls in the 
long run to the minimum family sustainable or ‘subsistence’ level (e.g., poverty-line wage, 
factoring in a nation’s social stage of development). The sustainable wage is marked as WS in 
panel (a) where D1 and S2 intersect (point E). Labour cost falls, therefore, and the size of the 
surplus (triangle) increases substantially (WSAE compared to W1AB). Exploitation also becomes 
nakedly obvious since employees (e.g., today’s fast-food workers) labour all year so they get just 
enough income (WS x L2) to survive to show up for work next year while all the nation’s 
discretionary income (WSAE) goes to the small minority of capital owners.  
 
Other writers in the RM tradition who work from a marginalist framework come to a roughly 
similar if more nuanced and contingent conclusion (Roemer, 1982; Elster, 1985). For Marx, 
exploitation is inherent to capitalism since the payment of profit to capitalists ensures that 
workers never receive the full value of their labour. Alternative conceptions exist, however. For 
example, using Ricardian rent theory, the Webbs (1897, 1902) argue similar to Marx that wages 
for unskilled workers are in the long run competed to the social subsistence level (Kaufman, 
2013). He and Beatrice (Webb and Webb, 1902: xxiii) state, for example, “We shall find wages 
everywhere forced down, for the ordinary, common skilled worker, to their ‘natural level’—that 
is, to the barest subsistence of the human animal from day to day”. In terms of Figure 1, they 
are claiming in the long run that the wage settles at WS (point E).  
 
However, the Webbs, like a number of institutionalists, neo-Marxists and Post-Keynesians (e.g., 
Commons, 1893, Robinson, 1966; Mayer, 1994), are not willing to follow Marx and attribute all 
the surplus to labour exploitation nor to embed it in a revolutionary class struggle defined by 
ownership of the means of production. The Webbs, for example, note that not all economic rent 
goes to capital since a portion also goes to skilled craft, professional and managerial workers 
who earn a “rent of ability” and “rent of opportunity.” Both the Webbs (1902) and Commons 
(1893), and later neo-Marxist writers such as Roemer (1982), locate exploitation in unequal 
ownership of property of all kinds (e.g., physical, human, financial, social). Contrary to Marx, 
therefore, many pluralist-radical writers do not regard exploitation as entirely a feature of the 
class system nor as inherent to the employment relationship; rather, the employment relation 
becomes exploitative only when income-generating property rights and resources are 
sufficiently unequal that workers are forced to accept wages, conditions, and treatment socially 
perceived as unreasonable/unjust.  
 
We illustrate this concept of exploitation (new to IR we believe) in panel (a) of Figure 1. Assume 
the market wage W1 represents a relatively balanced outcome, indicated by the location of the 
DS curves in the middle of the diagram (positive Marxian exploitation, zero institutional/Fabian 
exploitation, zero neoclassical DS exploitation). Drawn in below it at W2 is a dashed line 
representing where, in the consciousness of the workers, wages and conditions transition from 
fair (on or above the line) to unfair (below the line). That is, a certain degree of inequality is 
regarded as consistent with social justice but when the structure of laws, rights and 
endowments—ultimately determined at the State (roof) level—becomes too unequal and 
resulting wages and conditions forced too low in labour markets then the differential between 
what exists and the minimum fair level is regarded as exploitive. Commons (1934) frames this 
wage outcome as beneath reasonable value. 
 
Assume, for example, that Parliament, perhaps at the urging of employers or free market 
economists, eliminates all social safety net programs for workers, and opens national borders to 
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unrestricted immigration. The aggregate labour supply curve shifts rightward and the workforce 
expands until D1 = S2 at which point the wage = WS. As explained earlier, the size of the 
economic surplus expands but workers’ share decreases (assuming, as is realistic, an inelastic 
labour demand curve). From an institutional/Fabian perspective, exploitation increases from 
zero at W1 to W2HEWS at WS; from a neoclassical perspective, exploitation is still zero since 
workers are paid their value marginal product.  
 
Cooperation vs. Conflict 
 
The surplus concept leads to the incentives for both cooperation and conflict in the employment 
relationship. It is already evident from the preceding that a conflict situation can easily develop 
between labour and capital. The decision of the Parliament described above is easily 
interpretable by workers as socially unjust for it increases GDP and the surplus, benefits 
consumers with more goods at lower prices, and increases the profit share of capital yet results 
in lower wages (including compensating differentials), worsened conditions, and a smaller wage 
share of national income for labour. Employees could easily conclude that they have little 
reason to cooperate with this arrangement, leading to greater collective worker mobilization 
and collective action as Kelly (1998) predicts.  
 
Figure 1 provides an alternative way to demonstrate the conflict-cooperation tension in the 
employment relationship that originates in its very structure and not from a precipitating act of 
Parliament or some other outside force. Marx claims in early works (e.g., Wage Labour and 
Capital, 1849/1935) that the interests of workers and employers are inherently opposed since 
higher wages for workers mean lower profits for capitalists. In Figure 1, at the wage W1 the 
triangle measures the surplus and share going to capitalists. Viewed from a purely static 
perspective, it does appear that higher wages for workers mean lower profits for capitalists (i.e., 
the size of the triangle shrinks), and vice versa, thus setting up a negative-sum game in the 
employment relationship and basis for a continuing distributional struggle and state of 
antagonism between capital and labour.  
 
In more mature work, such as Volume I of Capital, Marx (1867/1906, Ch. 6) modifies this stark 
portrait and notes that the employment relationship, when viewed from a dynamic production 
perspective, creates incentives for both cooperation (positive-sum) and conflict (negative-sum). 
To analytically illustrate the push and pull of conflict vs. cooperation, it is helpful to pose these 
two questions: 1- what happens if workers decide to cooperate more in production?; and 2- 
how much (if any) do they gain from doing so? (Critics of economic formalism should work out 
the answers before proceeding.)  
 
The first question is answered by looking at the firm in panel (b). The firm is the site of 
production, indicated by the production function contained in the rectangle area at the bottom 
of the organization. Following Marx and as popularized by Braverman (1974), the rectangle is 
labeled the labour process. Employers in this economy contract for L1 units of labour time and 
pay the workers a wage W1. What produces output from the production function, however, is 
not labour time but volitional labour power L(e), where e is effort or “effective labour.” This 
uniquely human feature of labour is illustrated diagrammatically by embedding the e term in the 
person figure. Since workers are paid for their time and providing labour power is typically a 
source of disutility (from fatigue, boredom, subordination, etc.), their incentive is to hold down 
L(e) to the minimum consistent with keeping the job. This level of labour power, call it L(e1), 
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when combined with the given capital (K) and natural resource (N) inputs, produces an output 
Q1; in turn, variations in L (for a given e1) yield the neoclassical marginal revenue product 
schedule and labour demand curve in panel (a).  
 
Now assume workers decide to cooperate more. From a production (and employer’s) point of 
view, for labour to cooperate more means workers volitionally decide to more actively partner 
with managers to increase organizational performance. In our model, this translates into a 
higher value of e, say e2, and hence labour power and output rise to L(e2) and Q2, respectively. 
Since the DS diagram in panel (a) has labour time L on the horizontal axis, the same L1 units of 
labour time now have a higher total product and marginal product and, hence, the entire labour 
demand curve shifts upward and to the right to D2. For the same L1 units of labour, an increase 
in effective labour increases GDP to 0FJL1. 
 
Increased cooperation, therefore, does increase output and the size of the pie; the question, 
however, is what share of the larger pie (the ΔQ from Δe) workers get. If the share is large, 
workers have a reciprocally large incentive to cooperate, in effect creating the unity of interest 
type of employment relationship that lies at the heart of modern HRM and theories of the high 
performance/mutual gain workplace (Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Huselid, 1995; Boxall and 
Purcell, 2011). If, on the other hand, workers cooperate and provide Δe and gain little-to-
nothing then not only do they have little incentive to cooperate but also naturally feel 
antagonism toward managerial efforts to get them to do so since it amounts to greater (unpaid) 
exploitation of their labour (Hyman, 1975; Edwards, 1986; Gall and Hebdon, 2008).  
 
Microeconomic theory provides a guide to the share of ΔQ from increased cooperation that 
goes, respectively, to capital and labour owners. If an excise tax is put on a product, the supply 
curve shifts leftward and the theory of tax incidence predicts the share of the tax paid by 
consumers versus firms (Stiglitz, 2000). The fundamental prediction is that the party with the 
more elastic curve bears more of the tax since the existence of many substitutes for its services 
(the major determinant of DS curve elasticity) gives it correspondingly smaller power to shift the 
burden to the other party. The same type of analysis can be done in panel (a) to identify who 
gains from increased employee cooperation. Greater cooperation shifts the labour demand 
curve rightward to D2. Given supply curve S1, a new equilibrium is reached at higher wage W3 
(point G). The question is: does this new outcome provide incentive for the original L1 workers 
to furnish the cooperation that makes it possible?  
 
The answer, as indicated, turns on the respective elasticities of the DS curves. In the diagram, 
the portion of the newly created surplus going to the original L1 workers is area W3-W1 x L1. 
Although not drawn in, the reader can determine by doing so that if the labour supply curve is 
perfectly inelastic at L1 (a vertical line, indicating zero substitutes for the L1 workers), the wage 
rises commensurately with the demand curve shift and, accordingly, absorbs the extra surplus 
created by Δe and leaves profit the same. However, if the labour supply curve is perfectly elastic 
(horizontal, indicating perfect substitutes for the L1 workers) the opposite happens—the L1 
workers’ wage stays the same and all the increase in surplus goes to capital owners (employers).  
In general, therefore, our analysis supports the pluralist-radical contention that the employment 
relationship features incentives for both cooperation and conflict. What we add, however, is 
new analytical insight on the factors that determine the relative degree of cooperation and 
conflict. That is, workers in a particular employment relationship have more incentive to 
cooperate the larger is the share of the pie they take home as wages. This split occurs at two 
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levels in the employment relations system. The first is at the political economy level (roof) 
where the nation state determines the rules of the game and thus positions the DS curves. This 
dimension is insightfully articulated by Edwards, Bélanger and Wright (2006) who work out, 
based on what they call “the balance of class forces” and “wider power relationships” (p. 127), a 
four-cell matrix of cooperation-conflict dynamics based on permutations of what they call 
“developmental” and “control” processes. This matrix, in turn, influences the extent to which 
capitalists engage in positive-sum surplus sharing with workers. But, we argue, once the political 
economy constellation of forces and rules of the game are settled, a second set of determinants 
of labour’s share from cooperation comes into play at the level of the labour market. In 
particular, the amount of the new income created from cooperation that goes to labour 
depends, ceteris paribus, on the elasticity of the market supply curve of labour.  
 
In the RM literature, the labour supply curve is presumed to be more elastic than in a standard 
neoclassical model (indeed, near WS it is negatively sloped as workers increase hours to survive) 
and, hence, more of the extra surplus created by cooperation passes to employers. The most 
important reason is macroeconomic and rests on the Marxian notion of a reserve army of 
unemployed (Boddy and Crotty, 1975), although other factors—such as increasing ability of 
companies to shift production across regional and cross-national supply chains—are also 
important.  
 
We illustrate the reserve army idea with panel (c), the macro economy. Aggregate demand, 
C+I+G, and aggregate supply, given by the 45 degree line (showing equivalent levels of Q 
transposed from the horizontal axis), determine the level of GDP and employment. Neoclassical 
theory assumes, via Say’s Law and flexible prices and wages, that equilibrium GDP is at the full-
capacity/full employment level (Kaufman, 2012a). Call it Q1. RM and Post-Keynesian writers 
contend, however, that actual GDP, call it Q2, is typically below the full employment level. The 
recessionary gap Q1-Q2 creates a corresponding excess supply condition in the labour market, 
such as indicated at W3 (using D1, S1). Here is Marx’s reserve army or, alternatively, what the 
Webbs (1897) describe as “the unemployed….crowding around the factory gates every morning” 
(p. 660).  
 
The unemployment problem stems from insufficient aggregate demand (Robinson, 1966; Clarke, 
1994). Demand gradually falls short of full employment output for a number of reasons outlined 
by Marx (1867/1906), such as growing monopoly in product markets, rising share of constant 
(fixed) capital, labour-saving technical change, and widening income inequality. As a result, 
output does not grow fast enough to absorb the available labour supply and an overhang of 
unemployment provides the perfect substitutes for the L1 employed workers and, hence, render 
them powerless to capture part of the extra surplus created from cooperation or some other 
source of output gain. As a matter of realism, even with extensive unemployment in the 
economy some workers have sufficiently valuable skills and knowledge so that their supply 
curves remain upward sloping and they therefore have the ability to keep part of the fruits of 
cooperation—as per the Webbs’ notion of rent of ability. One can incorporate this nuance into 
RM theory with a model of dual/segmented labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; 
Edwards, Reich and Gordon, 1975). The flip side is that socially excluded and disadvantaged 
groups, such as women, immigrants and minorities, are doubly exposed to competition in 
secondary labour markets because of discrimination, segregation, and crowding (Gordon, 
Edwards and Reich, 1982; Albelda, 1997; McGovern, Hill, Mills and White, 2007). 
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Indeterminacy of the Labour Exchange 
 
The third fundamental feature of employment relations is the indeterminate nature of the 
labour exchange. As described earlier, this RM feature arises from the separation of labour time 
and labour power and the presence of incomplete employment contracts. In standard 
microeconomic theory, a commodity market yields a single going price for every unit traded (the 
law of one price). A feature of employment relationships, however, is that different units of 
labour, even if homogeneous in terms of all observable characteristics, still earn different wages 
that competition does not eliminate even in the long run (Botwinick, 1993; Fleetwood, 2006). 
The reason builds on the cooperation-conflict dynamic.  
 
Labour time is traded on a market and if perfectly homogeneous then every worker gets the 
same wage per hour, such as W1 in panel (a). This part of the market exchange can be written 
into a contract and becomes determinate. However, as already established, the value of the 
workers’ marginal product depends on their labour power L(e) and labour power is determined 
only after they have left the labour market in panel (a) and entered the firm in panel (b). Before 
production begins, therefore, the employer confronts a frequency distribution of potential 
marginal products, ranging from e = minimum to e = maximum. This distribution creates, in turn, 
a distribution of potential marginal products which, graphically, yields a band of values rather 
than a determinate point (Lester, 1952). Even if the labour supply curve is a pencil thin line (a 
determinate one-to-one relationship between wage and units of labour time offered), the band 
on the labour demand curve creates an area of indeterminacy in the labour market (Kaufman, 
2012b).  
 
Diagrammatically, in panel (a) the wage for the L1
th worker can vary from a low of W4 to high of 
W3 in this band. In neoclassical theory, such a band presumably arises from some type of friction 
that is either ruled out by assumption (e.g., perfect information) or is assumed to be eroded to 
zero over the long run by competition. In a RM account, however, the band and indeterminacy 
in wages is an inherent and persistent feature of employment relationships, as depicted in 
labour process theory (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). The employment relation in the firm, 
therefore, features an ongoing process of tacit bargaining, active control and resistance, and 
acquiescence and misbehaviour as employers and workers jockey over the terms of the 
wage/effort bargain (Edwards, 1990; Jaros, 2010).  
 
Asymmetry of Power in the Firm 
 
The fourth fundamental feature of the employment relationship is the asymmetry of power in 
the firm between employer and individual employee. Standard DS theory treats the labour 
market as a level playing field for employer and worker. In a competitive labour market, such as 
pictured in panel (a), both employer and employee are wage-takers and therefore have zero 
market power, rendering moot the concept of power inequality. Both pluralist and RM frames of 
industrial relations maintain, on the other hand, that the employer has a bargaining advantage 
vis-à-vis the individual worker; indeed, this premise goes back to Smith and the Wealth of 
Nations (1776/1937). The explanation is largely similar across the two frames, although the RM 
frame provides a broader and more class-based political economy perspective. Figure 1 provides 
a representation.  
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Inequality of power in the employment relationship comes from interaction of the three 
diagrams and governance roof. Typically, employers, property owners, the wealthy, and 
social/political insiders have disproportionate control and influence in the nation’s polity 
(because “dollar votes” outweigh “human votes”); indeed, in classic Marxism the state is the 
political arm of the capitalist class. They use their political power to structure socio-economic 
laws, rights, and endowments to advance their collective/class interests in gaining a larger share 
of the economic surplus (e.g., CEO compensation rules). Politics, therefore, becomes a way to 
structure the employment relationship so on the surface it looks like a level playing field but in 
reality is tipped against labour. For example, assume an employer-dominated government shifts 
the law from “just cause” to “at-will” termination, ends unemployment insurance, and allows 
striker replacement. All these actions reduce the workers’ bargaining power and reservation 
wages and, hence, shift the market labour supply curve in panel (a) rightward from, say, S1 to S2. 
From a neoclassical perspective, the new demand/supply equilibrium at WS is still competitively 
determined and thus a case of equal bargaining power. From a RM political economy 
perspective, however, workers suffer a bargaining disadvantage because a tipped legal regime 
creates a tipped DS outcome such that employers gain most (all) of the surplus.  
 
An insight of Marx, later extended by other heterodox/RM economists, such as Hobson (1909) 
and Baran and Sweezy (1966), is to note the destabilizing feedback loop that extends from the 
labour market in panel (a) to the macro economy in panel (c) and back to the labour market in 
panel (a). We highlight this loop by the dashed line going between Wage (panel a) and 
Aggregate Expenditure (panel c). That is, inequality of bargaining power reduces the wage rate 
and labour’s share of the surplus in panel (a), the lower wage share reduces household income 
and consumer spending (from C1 to C2) in panel (c) and shifts down the C+I+G aggregate demand 
line in the macro economy, the smaller amount of spending causes GDP to fall to Q2, and the 
resulting decrease in labour demand and rise in unemployment feed back into the labour 
market in panel (a) to further weaken labour’s bargaining power, and so on in a downward 
spiral. This downward spiral – exacerbated by the fact that a growing capital share of the surplus 
simultaneously creates financial market bubbles and over-accumulation of fixed capital on the 
aggregate supply side (not shown in the diagram to keep it simple)—leads to growing economic 
unbalance, instability, and ultimately crisis. The long-run tendency toward crisis (see Clarke, 
1994)—delayed, perhaps, by wars, debt accumulation, and fiscal/monetary stimulus (Baran and 
Sweezy, 1966)—becomes, in turn, a key component of the RM worker mobilization and strike 
theory advanced by Kelly (1998).  
 
One last abode of power inequality remains in Figure 1, however. It is inside the firm in panel 
(b). The law of the employment relationship gives the capitalist owner authority to direct 
(“boss”) employees in the performance of work tasks; likewise, the employer has the authority 
to create, administer and enforce all rules of the workplace and terminate employees if they 
violate them (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005). Neoclassical analysis suggests this power on the part 
of employers is formal but not substantive since the employee can always quit and find a job 
somewhere else and firms have a profit incentive to fairly treat workers in order to keep a 
reputation as a good employer (Wachter, 2003). Likewise, in HRM the employer’s legal power 
advantage—illustrated by the HRM box located in the top part of the firm’s command and 
control system—is moot since the employment relationship is (largely) mutual gain (Huselid, 
1995). The RM/pluralist contention, however, is that the employer’s power position is superior 
to the workers and has real bite; it is also an autocratic form of power since the employer 
controls the executive, legislative and judiciary functions of the firm’s governance system 
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(Edwards, 2003; Budd, 2004). In a minority of workplaces with a high performance/commitment 
HRM strategy, employer power may be relatively benign and exercised with a velvet glove; in 
the majority, however, employer power has a more overt and hard-fisted character exercised 
through tough discipline, supervision, and termination. 
 
This RM account calls attention to additional feedback loops in Figure 1 (various arrows not 
drawn in Figure 1 for visual simplicity). One such loop goes from labour market and macro 
economy (panels (a) and (c)) to firm (panel (b)) and back. The labour market and macro 
economy symbiotically create inequality of bargaining power, low wages, and involuntary 
unemployment. To keep their jobs and maintain minimum family income, and prodded by 
greater managerial pressure and threat of termination, workers in the firm increase effort 
(higher e) and output and aggregate supply expand, worsening the excess supply condition in 
product and labour markets. The result in the labour market is a yet lower wage which induces a 
further speed-up in the labour process, and so on. Note that this wage-effort link (W ↓ and e 
↑) is opposite the standard neoclassical efficiency wage story (wage ↑ and e ↑).  
 
The scenario just described matches the labour market experience in the Great Depression and 
provides an important explanation as to why institutional and RM economists of that era (e.g., 
Cole, 1935; Douglas, 1935) supported greater unionization, labour law, and social insurance as a 
way to stop the deflation cycle and augment family income and aggregate demand. This idea, 
for example, is written into the Preamble of the USA’s National Labour Relations Act (NLRA, 
1935) as a justification for encouragement of collective bargaining and, also, was widely cited as 
a justification for the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labour 
Standards Act (FLSA, 1938) (Kaufman, 2012a, 2012b). Of course, conventional economists 
criticize these ideas as wrong-headed and counter-productive (e.g., Neumark and Wascher, 
2008; Ohanian, 2009) and employers unite in both factory and legislature to oppose them.  
 
One reading of the American New Deal (e.g., Commons, 1934: Ch. 16) and British post-WWII 
welfare state is that they saved capitalism from the Marxian apocalypse (paradoxically, a crisis 
abetted by dysfunctional laissez-faire economic policies) through a feedback loop Marx had 
unduly discounted. This loop is the ability in a democracy of the workers and citizenry to unite 
and use the power of the State to override academic economic opinion and employer/elite 
influence and legislate the redistribution of rights, power and income necessary for social justice 
and renewed prosperity. However, in other countries, or perhaps in America or Britain of the 
present time, Marx may yet prove prescient to doubt that a (largely) peaceful “ballot box” 
revolution can rescue and reform the capitalist system before its inherent tendency toward 
economic inequality and social-political oligarchy becomes too large and entrenched. If so, a 
new cycle of industrial conflict and worker mobilization and radicalization commences as 




Industrial relations remains ‘theory short’ and, indeed, as was quoted in the Introduction some 
prominent scholars, such as Piore (2011) and Arthurs (2014), contend that the field has a failed 
intellectual framework which needs re-invention. The purpose of this paper is to advance IR 
theory by giving greater analytical representation to the dynamics of the employment 
relationship as contained in the field’s pluralist and radical-Marxist traditions, with the extra 
twist of using marginalist tools from orthodox economics. Besides helping integrate pluralist and 
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radical-Marxist frames of reference, our project also helps integrate British and American IR 
literatures, the former more open to RM ideas but closed to economic-type modeling and the 
latter much the opposite. 
 
To give this project a well-defined and manageable core, we focused on four foundational 
features of the employment relationship. These features are represented in a four-part political 
economy diagram. This exercise advances IR theory by giving it greater analytical 
representation, more precisely defining and representing key concepts, and demonstrates the 
theoretical contribution of an integrated pluralist-RM perspective. The economic crisis the world 
is now slowly recovering from, with strikes and labour protests breaking out across a number of 
countries, makes this analysis not only of intellectual interest but also of contemporary 
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